Posted by
Philip Mella on Wednesday, October 19, 2011 2:32:16 PM
Beyond the remarkable revelation that Iran intended a mass-casualty attack on U.S. soil with the goal of murdering Saudi Arabia’s ambassador, Adel al-Jubeir, is the implied sub-text: Since it’s arguably tantamount to a declaration of war, Iran is apparently convinced that the U.S. wouldn’t retaliate with a conventional attack.
Perceived weakness is the pretext for such strategic judgments, and the method is to gauge the temperament and predisposition of an adversary for retaliation. The mullahs in Iran obviously concluded that President Obama’s reticence to project power, his characterization of the U.S. as just another nation in the global pantheon of nations, and his denunciation of American exceptionalism, meant they could strike us with impunity.
We begin the historical analysis by analyzing the ostensible and de facto antecedents to the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. The ostensible issue was the mounting tensions between the two nations, but the de facto cause the deliberate exacerbation by Otto von Bismarck, using the so-called Ems Dispatch. The geo-political context was the ongoing contentions concerning the Spanish throne, but it was Bismarck’s tactical genius that made war inevitable—a war he knew would redound to his long-term designs.
The vacationing Prussian king, Wilhelm I, sent a dispatch to Bismarck in Berlin informing him of the escalating demands by the French ambassador, which included the thinly veiled threat of war. Knowing France was militarily compromised and in no position to fight, and having received permission from the king to issue a press release, Bismarck edited the dispatch, creating the distinct impression that Wilhelm had insulted the French ambassador, and, that the ambassador had insulted Wilhelm. The result is that it inflamed both sides, which resulted in the French summarily declaring war on Prussia.
Bismarck’s overarching goal was the unification of Prussia with Germany, and he not only prevailed in that regard, they captured the coveted Alcase-Lorraine territories as well. However, it was Bismarck’s astute understanding of France’s twin weaknesses—hubris and the apparently limitless capacity to seek revenge against perceived grievances—which resulted in his ingenious strategic calculus.
We segue to a more contemporary example, one that features the Kennedy-Khrushchev battle of wits, and highlights the importance of projecting political strength and creating uncertainty in terms of which strategic and tactical military options one might exercise.
After the Bay of Pigs disaster in April 1961, President Kennedy was anxious to meet with the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev. He told the press that his goal was to “understand one another’s purposes and interests.” However, he told his aid, Kenneth O’Donnell, another story: “I have to show Khrushchev we can be just as tough as he is. I’ll have to sit down with him and let him see who he’s dealing with.”
Khrushchev, for his part, contrasted his approach to Eisenhower with that of Kennedy: According to Fyodor Burlatsky, his aid, he called the former the “political wolf,” and said of the latter he intended to “put the young president in his place and secure concessions.” He correctly understood that Kennedy’s political advancement was largely due to his family’s political legacy, versus the product of having been tested in the crucible of retail politics.
There were also indications of hesitation by high-ranking U.S. officials about Kennedy’s ability to stand up to the Soviet leader, a well known potentate. George Ball, a State Department official, questioned the timing, “just after the series of defeats we have suffered in space, Cuba, and Laos.”
But Kennedy was determined and so the two met in Vienna in June of 1961. The young, untested president wanted to focus the discussion on the balance of power between the two nations, exclusively in the arena of ideas. In their first meeting he began lecturing the steely Soviet about the need to avoid inadvertent miscalculations in motives which, Kennedy argued, led to WWI.
Next, Kennedy made an astonishing strategic blunder: He said “We regard…Sino-Soviet forces and the forces of the United States and Western Europe as being more or less in balance.” Even if it were true, it would be a grossly naïve statement, which could undermine U.S. strategic efforts to contain Soviet expansionism. But it was patently false, since in 1961 everyone knew America enjoyed an overwhelming advantage in nuclear missiles.
In their next meeting, Khurshchev insisted on discussing his real concern—Berlin. The defense of West Berlin was an integral part of post-war U.S. policy, in particular as enshrined in the Potsdam Agreement. But Khurshchev was intransigent, telling Kennedy, “If the U.S. wants to start a war over Germany, let it be so.”
The academic Kennedy reverted to his theme of avoiding a miscalculation which could result in war, but Khrushchev smelled blood, stating that the “Soviet Union would never under any conditions accept American rights in West Berlin.”
Revisionists take issue with the conclusion that Khrushchev was convinced Kennedy could be subjugated, but, again quoting Burlatsky:
Kennedy seemed to Khrushchev more like an advisor, not a political decision-maker or President. He thought Kennedy too young, intellectual, not prepared well for decision making in crisis situations.
The issue of the Berlin wall completes the argument that weakness abets aggression, and that telegraphing certainty concerning military options undermines optimal outcomes. Although cold-warrior Dean Acheson told Kennedy there could be “no negotiations and no concessions” concerning Berlin, others, including Kennedy, were reticent to hold the line. As Kennedy said:
It seems silly for us to be facing an atomic war over a treaty preserving Berlin as the future capital of a reunited Germany when all of us know that Germany will probably never be reunited…Before I back Khrushchev against the wall and put him to the final test, the freedom of all Western Europe will have to be at stake.
Moreover, Democratic senator Mike Mansfield advocated making Berlin a “free city,” and J. William Fullbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said on national television that “the Russians have the power to close the border…they could do it without violating any treaty.”
Shortly thereafter, Kennedy told foreign policy advisor, Walt Rastow, that Khrushchev “will have to do something to stop the flow of refugees. Perhaps a wall. And we won’t be able to prevent it…”. Kennedy gave a speech on July 25th with strong language concerning the defense of West Berlin [emphasis added], but not of “Berlin,” and Khrushchev understood the tacit implication—that Kennedy would defend only West Berlin and that a wall would be acceptable. At midnight on August 12th, barbed-wire was erected, which was the precursor to the wall.
The quintessential, summary criticism of Kennedy came from McGeorge Bundy, his National Security Advisor:
It might have been wise at least to be less clear about it—to leave Khurshchev with greater uncertainty—to leave room in his mind for the possibility that a wall might mean war.
Closing the polemical loop relative to our challenges with Iran, a cursory review of Mr. Obama’s speech in Cairo demonstrates his masterful ignorance of the threat of radical Islam. Indeed, his thoroughgoing naiveté regarding the insidious nature of this gathering storm is on a par with Chamberlain who, after meeting with Hitler in Munich said, “I think we can work with Herr Hitler.”
With respect to Iran’s intent to obtain nuclear weapons, Obama is an stalwart appeaser, effectively telling the extremists in Iran that he would never stand in their way. His speech included this study in strategic anemia:
There will be many issues to discuss between our two countries, and we are willing to move forward without preconditions on the basis of mutual respect. But it is clear to all concerned that when it comes to nuclear weapons, we have reached a decisive point.
What point might that be, you ask? He never answers the question. That uniquely permissive rhetoric recalls Kennedy’s strategically obtuse pronouncements regarding Berlin, which convinced Khrushchev that he would stand idly by as the wall was constructed. The wall was, in fact, built, and Iran is, in fact, fast tracking its acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Mr. Obama has stated that we have irrefutable evidence that Iran is guilty of plotting the assassination of the Saudi ambassador, in what would have been a mass-casualty attack on U.S. soil. And, he has stated that all options are on the table. However, since presidential muscles atrophy without exercise, it’s evident that Iran’s punishment will be more of the same—feckless sanctions and public posturing, which any belligerent knows is code for the habitual inability take decisive action.
Iran’s Ahmadinejad knows he controls the strategic agenda and that, not unlike Khurshchev who correctly recognized weakness in Kennedy, he can bully the young, intellectual, untested president, without any threat of retaliation.
As we have learned, concessions made to adversaries, designed with breezy good will to elicit reciprocity, have had—to put it charitably—mixed results. Convinced that his trans-political acumen and rhetorical verve can win against the nefarious likes of Iran, Obama is unwittingly augmenting Iran’s hegemonic designs, and America will pay the price.