Posted by
ClearCommentary.com on Wednesday, February 21, 2007 3:13:18 PM
An editorial by John Hughes, writing in The Christian Science Monitor, provides the framework for our analysis of our progress with respect to the much maligned Axis of Evil, as articulated by President Bush in his 2002 State of the Union Address.
North Korea:
Mr. Hughes 'damns with faint praise' the recently reached agreement with this Stalinist nation and only glancingly references the key difference between President Clinton's naive "Agreed Framework" and that of President Bush. In the 1990s, whether due to a misperception of the geopolitical landscape or residual post-Cold War hubris, Mr. Clinton entered negotiations bilaterally with North Korea. Although other nations weighed in, they were not formal signatories to the Agreement.
In stark contrast, and, ironically, heeding the Democrats' incessant calls for multilateral talks, Mr. Bush saw in the thicket of incentives and disincentives that China held the proverbial knife to cut this Gordian knot. Add to that mix the Japanese, who, since Kim Jong Il lobbed missiles into the Sea of Japan, has been contemplating a revision of its defensive posture, to, at least in theory, include offensive nuclear weapons.
The result is that although there is every reason to be keenly skeptical, and although we have argued that a far more aggressive approach would have abridged the process, this is clearly the most conservative solution the U.S. might have reached and one worth our effort.
Iraq:
Again, Mr. Hughes skims timorously across the surface of America's situation in Iraq. The 'troop surge' that President Bush has initiated is beginning to see modest results, however, if this strategic realignment continues to bear fruit by keeping the warring parties apart, the political solution may have a chance.
Recall that the Sunnis, Kurds, and Shiites have lived in the region in relative peace for centuries, and, for that matter, the analog of this quandary, Bosnia, is a farmore contentious mix of ethnically diverse peoples, and they lived in relative calm until WWI.
The obvious flaws of President Bush's unitive in Iraq is the failure to appreciate that our stellar three-week military campaign only lit the fuse of the ethnic hatreds that Saddam's iron-fisted rule kept in check. If the current Iraqi leadership can leverage its political power to provide strong and credible incentives as well as meaningful disincentives to the Sunnis and Shiites, the chance for nominal peace moves into the realm of the possible.
Iran:
We are often counseled by Democrats, and even a few Republicans, that there is nothing more dangerous than invading Iran. President Bush's plan, which appears to be diplomatically slow-walking President Ahmadinejad, seems to be achieving results. By tightening Iran's external financial resources, whether it's in banking or through trade, and with our carrier groups near by, we are expressing the will of the otherwise feckless free world, in terms that are unambiguous, if not overly threatening.
The strategic conundrum we face is that in each evolving circumstance we can never know the consequences of the failure to act. Indeed, at every step of the way as the conflagration of WWII was ignited, military historians speculated on how different the ultimate outcome might have been had the allies acted, from the first real opportunity in 1936 when Hitler moved his army into the Rhineland. Had that happened there would have been a reasonable chance that war would not have been sparked. The difference is best measured by the 40 million souls who would not have been killed.
In our overheated debate concerning Iran we find the same hand-wringing and stern admonitions concerning any suggestion that the U.S. and its allies might be forced to take military action. Indeed, the political realities we face have effectively precluded even obliquely telegraphing that 'all options are on the table.'
Ironically, the same crowd shrinks into the fetal position when the issue of a full gamut of sanctions is raised, in particular, making it clear to Russia that their continued work at the Bushehr reactor will have adverse consequences to its relationship with the U.S. Concurrently, Western Europe is Iran's largest trading partner and we must also inform them that support for a known terrorist regime will cause them indirect economic pain.
There are in all three of these situations real opportunities to mitigate the long-term fallout and damage to all parties concerned. But the studied reticence that is currently being exhibited by the U.S. and its allies will only guarantee that the problems will slowly be compounded, and solutions that don't involve all-out military action more elusive, which may, inadvertently demand such action.